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THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT: A
STUDY IN THE CODIFICATION OF THE
ETHNIC BEST INTERESTS OF THE CILD
JENNIFER NUTT CARLETON*
For this whole century, right up until 1978 when we got the
Indian Child Welfare Act, social workers would come in here
with no understanding of how our families worked. They
would see a child who'd been left with someone outside the
nuclear family, and they would call that neglect. To us, that is
an insane rationale. We don't distinguish between father, un-
cle, mother, grandmother. We don't think of ourselves as
having extended families. We look at you guys and think you
have contracted families. We couldn't understand why they
were taking us apart. My brother Gabe, going to a man and
woman in Texas when we had a whole family here. I've seen
babies carried off with no more thought than you'd give a bag
of brown sugar you picked up at the market.'
The current controversy over the role of race and ethnicity in adop-
tion proceedings primarily centers on the placement of black children
with white foster or adoptive families. While some authors argue that
race matching is justified only if the best interests of the child are served
by such a policy,2 others have called the practice of placing children of
color with white families racial "genocide., 3 The Supreme Court ad-
dressed the issue of race and child placement in Palmore v. Sidoti.4 Al-
though the court held that race may not be the sole factor in a decision
to remove a child from her natural mother, the question of whether race
* BA, Indiana University, 1991; JD, University of Wisconsin Law School, 1996; Staff
attorney, Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wisconsin. Special thanks to Attorney Aurene Martin
for all her help and guidance in the writing of this article and to Francis J. Carleton for his
encouragement and support.
1. BARBARA KINGSOLVER, PIGS IN HEAVEN 284 (1993).
2. See Kim Forde-Mazrui, Note, Black Identity and Child Placement: The Best Interests
of Black and Biracial Children, 92 MICH. L. REV. 925 (1994).
3. Id. at 925-26 (citing NATIONAL ASSN. of BLACK SOCIAL WORKERS, POSITION
PAPER (Summer 1973)); See also Catherine M. Brooks, The Indian Child Welfare Act in Ne-
braska: Fifteen Years, A Foundation for the Future, 27 CREIGHTON L. REV. 661,668 (1994).
4. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
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can play a role in some child-placement contexts was left unanswered
Many of the arguments for and against transracial adoption focus on
the "best interests of the child" standard, which is used by most state
courts to determine where a child will be placed. The "best interests of
the child" has been described as nebulous and largely undefined When
implementing this standard, state legislatures, courts, and social welfare
agencies are left to define the best interests of a child. In 1993, members
of Congress sought to codify this "best interests" standard into a federal
child placement law, providing that the best interests of a child would be
served by placing him or her with a racially "matched" family." This
Act, the Howard M. Metzenbaum Multiethnic Placement Act, was
passed in an amended form in 1994.' The cited purpose of the Act was
to prevent "discrimination in the placement of children on the basis of
race, color, or national origin" and to facilitate the "identification and
recruitment of foster and adoptive families that can meet children's
needs."10 In essence, the Multiethnic Placement Act provided that child
placement agencies should make every effort to place a child with a race
matched family, provided that such efforts were non-discriminatory.
This Act was repealed with the enactment of § 1808(c) of the Small
Business Job Protection Act in 1996."1 The Small Business Job Protec-
tion Act provides:
(1)Prohibited Conduct. A person or government that is involved
in adoption or foster care placements may not
5. Id. at 434.
6. For a list of state child-placement statutes setting forth the best interests of the child
standard, see Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face
of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226,236-37 (1975).
7. Maria E. Selmann, For the Sake of the Child: Moving Toward Uniformity in Adoption
Law, 69 WASH. L. REV. 841, 843 (1994). "Some states list factors that may or may not be
considered in making the determination [of the best interests of the child), such as race, re-
ligion, sexual orientation, family relationship, or status as a foster parent, but states lack spe-
cific guidelines for determining exactly what is in the child's best interest." Id. at 843-44
(citations omitted).
8. The Multiethnic Placement Act of 1993 "prohibits an agency, or entity, that receives
Federal assistance and is involved in adoptive or foster care placements from delaying or de-
nying the placement of a child solely on the basis of race, color, or national origin of the
adoptive or foster parent or parents involved." S. 1224, 103d Cong. (1993). This Act was in-
troduced by Senator Metzenbaum on July 14, 1993, and was considered during a subcommit-
tee hearing on July 15, 1993. It was reported by the Committee on Labor and Human Re-
sources on October 6, 1993.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 5115a (repealed 1996).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 5115a(b) (repealed 1996).
11. Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1808(c), 110 Stat.
1904 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1996b (1996)).
[Vol. 81:21
THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT
(A) deny to any individual the opportunity to become an
adoptive or a foster parent, on the basis of the race, color, or
national origin of the individual, or of the child involved; or
(B) delay or deny the placement of a child for adoption or
into foster care, on the basis of the race, color, or national
origin of the adoptive or foster parent, or the child involved."
This Act eliminated the "recruitment of families that meet a child's
needs" language, and was an attempt by Congress to codify the "best in-
terests of a child" standard. In this case, Congress determined that the
best interests of a child would be served through placement with a fam-
ily as quickly as possible, regardless of the race of the family.
Codification of the "best interests" standard, as it applies to race and
ethnicity, removes discretion from family law judges and child welfare
agencies. By defining the role of ethnicity in placement decisions, Con-
gress is attempting to limit the autonomy of these decision makers. It is
interesting to note, therefore, that though the Indian Child Welfare
Act 3 (ICWA) employs "best interests" language, and is also a codifica-
tion of the "best interests" standard as it applies to child placement pro-
ceedings, most discussions of transracial adoption give only a passing
nod in the direction of ICWA. An analysis of ICWA may provide in-
sight into the effectiveness of race matching statutes, and the feasibility
of eliminating the discretion of judges and child welfare agencies in
making placement decisions.
This article is not a comparative study on the provisions of ICWA
and other race matching legislation. This article will address ICWA as
one attempt to codify the best interests of a child in terms of the child's
racial and ethnic heritage. The problems and controversies surrounding
ICWA could assist legislators in their attempts to codify the "best inter-
ests of a child" in racial terms. The current Congressional attempts to
modify ICWA may also guide the present race matching debate.
Comparing the placement of Indian children with non-Indian fami-
lies with the placement of black children with non-black families is
problematic. As Toni Hahn Davis notes in The Existing Indian Family
Exception to the Indian Child Welfare Act
Throughout American history, there has been a remarkable
double standard regarding Indians and blacks ... Chief Justice
Taney, in Dred Scott v. Sandford, summed up this double stan-
dard when he compared the population of imported Africans and
12. Id.
13. 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq. (1978).
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their descendants-"considered ... an inferior class of beings"-
to the Indian race-"uncivilized ... yet a free and independent
people, associated together in nations or tribes, and governed by
their own laws.,
14
So too is the history of adoptive placements different for Indian children
than for black children. As Zanita E. Fenton argues in In A World Not
Their Own: The Adoption of Black Children,5 black children are des-
perately in need of adoption services. 6 Yet, ICWA was passed for pre-
cisely the opposite reason, to stop the involuntary removal of Indian
children from their reservations and families. Despite the passage of
ICWA, however, Indian children are still placed in non-Indian homes,
and "Indian families continue to be confronted with an unreasonably
high risk that their homes will be disrupted and that their children will
face cultural confusion and disorientation."'7
Another reason to limit the comparison of Indian and black children
in child placement proceedings is the unique political and legal position
of Indians in the United States. Whether an Indian tribe is defined as a
political or a racial entity is one aspect of this unique position. Another
is the concurrent and exclusive jurisdiction provisions of ICWA. Be-
cause Indian tribes may develop and maintain separate court systems,
these jurisdictional provisions in ICWA are not only feasible but neces-
sary.'8 None of the proposed Congressional measures regarding transra-
cial adoption propose a separate jurisdiction for placement proceedings
concerning black children. Indeed, it would be impossible to maintain
such a jurisdictional scheme.' 9
The examination of why, despite the passage of ICWA, Indian chil-
14. Toni Hahn Davis, The Existing Indian Family Exception to the Indian Child Welfare
Act, 69 N.D. L. REV. 465-66 (1993) (citations omitted).
15. 10 HARV. BLACKLETrER J.39(1993).
16. See Davidson M. Pattiz, Racial Preference in Adoption: An Equal Protection Chal-
lenge, 82 GEO. L.J. 2571 (1994). Pattiz argues that "pressing too hard for race-matching in
the adoption of black children will interfere with the child's best interest by relegating her to
a family that is less well off." Id. at 2573.
17. Stan Watts, Voluntary Adoptions Under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978. Bal-
ancing the Interests of Children, Families, and Tribes, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 213, 215 (1989).
18. For a review of the concurrent and exclusive jurisdiction provisions of ICWA, and
the treatment of tribal jurisdiction of matters arising under ICWA by state courts, see Mi-
chael E. Connelly, Tribal Jurisdiction Under Section 1911(b) of the Indian Child Welfare Act
of 1978: Are the States Respecting Indian Sovereignty?, 23 N.M. L. REV. 479 (1993).
19. Tribes occasionally must litigate which Tribe has jurisdiction over a particular Indian
child, especially a child who is not enrolled in any Tribe but eligible for enrollment in more
than one. States face similar jurisdiction problems in child custody matters. See Christopher
L. Blakesley, Child Custody-Jurisdiction and Procedure, 35 EMORY L.J. 291 (1986).
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dren continue to be placed with non-Indian foster care and adoptive
families, could be an important step toward redefining the role of trans-
racial placement legislation. Understanding why ICWA has at times
failed to preserve the "Indian family" might aid in the discussion of the
role of ethnicity preferencing statutes in the current debate over trans-
racial adoption.
I. THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT
The Indian Child Welfare Act was passed in 1978 in response to in-
creasing awareness by Congress that tribes rather than states should
have jurisdiction over child placement proceedings:
Congress recognized that state social welfare systems, influenced
by the cultural bias that informed assimilationist policies, re-
moved Native American children from their families and tribes
in extraordinary numbers. Those state actions threatened Native
American tribes with cultural extinction and inflicted the heart-
break of forced separation on Native American families. The
strategy for cultural and familial survival advocated in the con-
gressional hearings rested on tribal autonomy over the placement
of tribal children.
ICWA was an acknowledgment by Congress of the need for tribal court
jurisdiction over cases involving tribal children. The jurisdictional
scheme of ICWA can be divided into three distinct factual scenarios.
When an Indian child is domiciled on a reservation, section 1911(a) pro-
vides that the child's tribe shall have exclusive jurisdiction.2" When an
Indian child is not domiciled on the reservation, section 1911(b) pro-
vides that the child's tribe will have concurrent jurisdiction with the
State.22 In some cases, the child's tribe will not have a court system in
20. Jeanne Louise Carriere, Representing the Native American: Culture, Jurisdiction, and
the Indian Child Welfare Act, 79 IOWA L. REv. 585, 600-01 (1994).
21. That section reads as follows:
Exclusive jurisdiction. An Indian tribe shall have jurisdiction exclusive as to any
State over any child custody proceeding involving an Indian child who resides or is
domiciled within the reservation of such tribe, except where such jurisdiction is oth-
erwise vested in the State by existing Federal law. Where an Indian child is a ward
of a tribal court, the Indian tribe shall retain exclusive jurisdiction, notwithstanding
the residence or domicile of the child.
25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (1978).
22. That section reads as follows:
Transfer of proceedings; declination by tribal court. In any State court proceeding
for the foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child
not domiciled or residing within the reservation of the Indian child's tribe, the court,
in the absence of good cause to the contrary, shall transfer such proceeding to the
1997]
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place. However, the child's tribe is still entitled to notice of any child
placement proceeding involving a tribal child,' and the right to inter-
vene in the State court proceedings." The child's tribe also has the right
to void any court proceedings that are not in compliance with ICWA.,
An Indian child is defined under the act as "any member of an Indian
tribe" or any child "eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the
biological child of a member of an Indian tribe."'26
The real bite of ICWA is the preferencing section, which provides a
list of preferences for Indian children placed in foster care or adoptive
homes." In adoptive placements, an Indian child shall be placed first
with a member of the child's extended family, second with other mem-
bers of the Indian child's tribe, or third with other Indian families.' In
foster care placements, an Indian child shall be placed first with a mem-
ber of the child's extended family, second with a foster home specified
by the child's tribe, third with an Indian foster home, and fourth in an
jurisdiction of the tribe, absent objection by either parent, upon the petition of ei-
ther parent or the Indian custodian or the Indian child's tribe: Provided, that such
transfer shall be subject to declination by the tribal court of such tribe.
25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (1978). For a comprehensive analysis of the impact of the concurrent
jurisdiction provisions of the I.C.W.A. on the "cultural construction of the Native American,"
see Carriere, supra note 19.
23. 25 U.S.C. § 1912 (1978); see also Douglas R. Nazarian, Catholic Social Services, Inc.
v. C.A.A.: Best Interests and Statutory Construction of the Indian Child Welfare Act, 7
ALASKA L. REV. 203, 215 (1990). Nazarian argues that "[w]ithout some means of ensuring
that tribes can intervene, their ability to protect their interests as Congress intended will be
significantly impaired." Id. (citing In re J.R.S., 690 P.2d 10, 15 (Alaska 1984) ("If Indian
tribes are to protect the values Congress recognized when it enacted the Indian Child Wel-
fare Act, tribes must be allowed to participate in hearings at which those values are signifi-
cantly implicated.")).
24. See 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c) (1978):
State court proceedings; intervention. In any State court proceeding for the foster
care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child, the Indian
custodian of the child and the Indian child's tribe shall have a right to intervene at
any point in the proceeding.
25. See 25 U.S.C. § 1914 (1978):
Petition to court of competent jurisdiction to invalidate action upon showing of cer-
tain violations. Any Indian child who is the subject of any action for foster care
placement or termination of parental rights under State law, any parent or Indian
custodian from whose custody such child was removed, and the Indian child's tribe
may petition any court of competent jurisdiction to invalidate such action upon a
showing that such action violated any provision of sections 101, 102, and 103 of this
Act. [25 U.S.C. §§ 1911, 1912, and 1913].
26. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (1978).
27. 25 U.S.C. § 1915 (1978).
28. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1978).
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institution approved by the child's tribe.' These placement preferences
are applicable to both State and tribal agencies, and include a provision
that any placement agency must adhere to "prevailing social and cul-
tural standards of the Indian community in which the parent or ex-
tended family resides."'
ICWA embodies implicit assumptions about what is in the "best in-
terests" of an Indian child. When it enacted ICWA, Congress recog-
nized that the best interests of Indian children are of tantamount impor-
tance, that the best interests of an Indian child are served by ensuring
tribal participation in placement and adoption proceedings, and that
tribal participation in proceedings involving Indian children is necessary
because "the States, exercising their recognized jurisdiction over Indian
child custody proceedings through administrative and judicial bodies,
have often failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian
people and the cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian com-
munities and families."31 The underlying premise of ICWA is that In-
dian tribes, as sovereign governments, have a vital interest in any deci-
sion as to whether Indian children should be separated from their
families.3 2 To that end, ICWA applies a "best interests of the tribe"
standard, in addition to the best interests of the child and the parent.
Prior to the passage of ICWA in 1978, a very high percentage of In-
dian families were "broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of
their children from them by nontribal public and private agencies."' In
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield,3 the Supreme Court
29. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(b) (1978).
30. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1978).
31. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5) (1978).
32. Manuel P. Guerrero, Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: A Response to the Threat to
Indian Culture Caused by Foster and Adoptive Placements of Indian Children, 7 AM. INDIAN
L. REV. 51, 66 (1979).
33.
Two sometimes competing interests are involved: a parent's interests in raising a
child as he or she sees fit and the tribe's interest in fostering its community by pre-
serving Indian families. The Act accommodates these interests in two manners. As
to Indian children domiciled on the reservation, the interests are presumed to coin-
cide ... In such cases, the tribe's interests in its children "is distinct from but on a
parity with the interests of the parents." When the child is domiciled off the reser-
vation, the relationships shift under the Act and the parents' interests may be pri-
mary.
In re Larissa G. v. Gina L, 43 Cal. App. 4th 505, 512, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16, 20 (Cal. App. 4th
1996) (citations omitted).
34. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(4) (1978).
35. 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
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noted that studies presented in the 1974 Senate hearings "showed that
25 to 35% of all Indian children had been separated from their families
and placed in adoptive families, foster care, or institutions."' The court
went on to note that in 1971 and 1972, "[t]he adoption rate of Indian
children was eight times that of non-Indian children, [and that] ap-
proximately 90% of Indian placements were in non-Indian homes."
3
Many social workers unused to working with Indian families and chil-
dren, or perhaps hostile to an unfamiliar culture, consider leaving a child
with persons outside the nuclear family as neglect and thus good cause
for terminating parental rights.' As noted in a Washington Post article
addressing proposed amendments to ICWA:
On many reservations it was once enough for caseworkers to de-
cide arbitrarily that a family was too poor to raise a child. It was
overlooked that in tribal cultures the amount of care given a
child often went well beyond one household. The full social and
blood-tie network of parents, grandparents, relatives and neigh-
bors was a wealth not categorized on a caseworker's clipboard of
acceptable standards for child-raising. 9
ICWA was a response by Congress to this involuntary removal of
Indian children from Indian tribes by state agencies. The stated pur-
poses of ICWA are:
To protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote
the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by the es-
tablishment of minimum Federal standards for the removal of
Indian children from their families and the placement of such
children in foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the unique
values of Indian culture, and by providing for assistance to In-
dian tribes in the operation of child and family service pro-
grams.'
It is in light of these Congressional goals that the role of ethnicity,
and the effectiveness of ICWA in regulating that role, will be examined.
36. Id. at 32.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 35, n.4; see also Brooks, supra note 3 at 667 ("Up to now, however, public and
private welfare agencies seem to have operated on the premise that most [American] Indian
children would really be better off growing up non-Indian.").
39. Colman McCarthy, Reopening the Drain on Indians Legacy," WASHINGTON POST,
July 16, 1996, at B8.
40. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1978).
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II. THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD UNDER ICWA
The language of ICWA is clear and relatively unambiguous with
specific placement preferences. As previously noted, ICWA was an at-
tempt by Congress to codify the best interests of the child standard.
What this codification necessarily means is that courts and state agencies
will no longer apply the best interests of the child standard but instead
will look to the specific provisions of ICWA in making placement deci-
sions. Parties who are unable to adopt Indian children under the pref-
erencing mandates of ICWA have sought to circumvent the Act. This
circumvention has been accomplished in a variety of ways. There is
considerable anecdotal evidence that natural parents are often told by
adoption attorneys and agencies that they should not reveal that a child
is of Indian heritage in order to avoid the application of the Act.' Other
approaches for avoiding the application of the Act which have occurred
include attorney-induced renunciations of tribal membership by the
parent or the transport of such children out of the country for place-
ment, often to provinces in Canada that do not have laws dealing with
the adoption of Indian children.
Other parents have resorted to the court system. Parties have ar-
gued that ICWA does not apply to illegitimate Indian children.43 Others
have relied on the familiar best interests of the child standard to argue
for placement of an Indian child outside of the preferences outlined in
ICWA. ICWA states that the placement preferences outlined must be
followed "in the absence of good cause to the contrary."' The Bureau
of Indian Affairs (BIA) has issued guidelines regarding this "good
cause" inquiry:
For purposes of ... adoptive placement, a determination of good
cause not to follow the order of preference set out above shall be
based on one or more of the following considerations:
(i) The request of the biological parents or the child when the
child is of sufficient age.
41. Establishing Status of Indian Children: Hearings on S. 1448 Before the House Sub-
committee on Native American and Insular Affairs, 104th Cong. 34-35 (1995) (Statement of
Attorney Jack Trope); see also Susan Estrich, Indian Rights Win, Two Children Lose, USA
TODAY, July 13,1995, at 9A.
42. Susan Estrich, Indian Rights Win, Two Children Lose, USA TODAY, July 13, 1995, at
9A
43. For a listing of these cases, see Michelle L. Lehmann, The Indian Child Welfare Act
of 1978. Does it Apply to the Adoption of an Illegitimate Indian Child?, 38 CATH. U. L. REV.
511-13 (1989).
44. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a)-(b) (1978).
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(ii) The extraordinary physical or emotional needs of the
child as established by testimony of a qualified expert wit-
ness.
(iii) The unavailability of suitable families for placement after
a diligent search has been completed for families meeting the
preference criteria.'
The BIA guidelines avoid the use of any "best interests" language,
which would suggest the "best interests of the child" standard has no
place in determining good cause. ' However, the "good cause excep-
tion" contained in ICWA has led some state courts to find to the con-
trary that the best interests of the child is good cause.
In Yavapai-Apache Tribe v. Mejia,'7 the Appellant argued that the
state court had abused its discretion in considering the best interests of
the child as a reason to retain jurisdiction of a child placement matter
under ICWA.4' The Texas Court of Appeals found that the term "good
cause" in ICWA was "designed to provide state courts with flexibility in
determining the disposition of a placement proceeding involving an In-
dian child., 49 The court then went on to hold that the best interests of
the child standard was inapplicable in cases arising under ICWA be-
cause:
(1) it defeats the very purpose for which ICWA was enacted, in
that, it allows Anglo cultural biases into the analysis; and (2)
questions of "best interest" are appropriate to issues of place-
ment, not jurisdiction."
The Yavapai-Apache Tribe court recognized that the best interests of an
Indian child can be very different culturally and legally than the best in-
terests of a non-Indian child. "Under ICWA, what is best for an Indian
child is to maintain ties with the Indian tribe, culture, and family.""1
This decision was in accordance with many other state courts reject-
ing the "best interests of the child" standard's application under
ICWA.52 Some courts, however, have held that the "best interests of the
45. 44 Fed. Reg. 67594 F.3(a) (1979).
46. Michael J. Dale, State Court Jurisdiction Under the Indian Child Welfare Act and the
Unstated Best Interest of the Child Test, 27 GONz. L. REV. 353, 387 (1991-1992).
47. 906 S.W.2d 152 (Tex. App. 1995).
48. Id. at 168.
49. Id. at 164.
50. Id. at 169.
51. Id.
52. For a listing of state courts that have rejected the best interests of the child standard
as a good cause consideration under ICWA, see id.; see also In the Matter of the Adoption of
Jessica Lynn Riffle, 922 P.2d 510, 515 (Mont. 1996) (specifically rejecting the best interests of
[Vol. 81:21
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child" standard is an appropriate consideration in determining good
cause to disregard the placement provisions of ICWA.53
The "best interests of the child" standard is a familiar construct in
state court, and one judges are loathe to forego in favor of a codified
standard under federal law. As one author argues in an article address-
ing a need for uniformity in adoption law, "While all of these parties' in-
terests merit consideration, the most important factor should be the best
interests of the child. ' m The placement preferences of ICWA do not
contain any best interests language. Yet, some state courts have consis-
tently sought to utilize this standard under ICWA. A good cause excep-
tion that embodies the best interests standard renders specific place-
ment preferences meaningless. Codifying the best interests of a child
with regard to ethnicity, then, requires a clear mandate with regard to
preferencing. Legislators attempting to codify the best interests of a
child with regard to ethnicity must clearly and specifically reject any ap-
plication of a state or court defined best interests of the child standard.
Ill. THE INDIAN FAMILY EXCEPTION
To avoid the placement preferences embodied in ICWA, parties
have also argued that an "Indian family" exception to ICWA exists.
The Indian family exception focuses on two separate but related in-
quiries; whether the child has ever been a part of an Indian tribe or
community, and whether the child's birth parents have ever been a part
of an Indian tribe or community.5 If a child or the child's parents are
found to have insufficient ties to the Indian tribe attempting to inter-
vene in a child custody proceeding, some state courts have held that
ICWA does not apply, reasoning that in such cases, ICWA's stated goal
of "promoting the stability and security of Indian tribes and families" is
not met.56
A majority of state courts considering this issue have found that the
"Indian family" doctrine is not a valid exception to ICWA. In rejecting
the "Indian family" exception, many of these state courts rely on the
Supreme Court's holding in Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v.
the child analysis as "unnecessary and inappropriate" when determining good cause under
ICWA).
53. Adoption of Jessica Lynn Riffle, 922 P.2d at 515; see also In the Matter of Baby Boy
Doe, 902 P.2d 477, 487 (Idaho 1995) (declining to overturn a trial court's determination that
"good cause" existed to disregard the placement preferences contained in ICWA).
54. Selmann, supra note 7, at 850.
55. Watts, supra note 17, at 225.
56. Id.
1997]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Holyfield . In Holyfield, the Mississippi Choctaw parents of twins, who
were residents of their reservation, moved off the reservation to have
their children." The move was specifically to defeat the provisions of
ICWA and allow them to voluntarily give up their babies for adoption. 9
The Holyfield majority held that ICWA "was not meant to be defeated
by the actions of individual members of the tribe," and that the Act's
provisions must be seen "as a means of protecting not only the interests
of individual Indian children and families, but also of the tribes them-
selves. ' There is an underlying presumption in ICWA:
that it is in the best interest of an Indian child that the role of the
tribal community in the child's life be protected. Thus, the dual
purposes promoted by the Act-the "best interests of Indian
children" and the promotion of "stability and security of Indian
tribes and families"-are intertwined.61
The same logic employed by the Supreme Court in Holyfield was
subsequently employed by the Utah Supreme Court in In the Matter of
the Adoption of Jeremiah Halloway,62 when it stated that "Utah aban-
donment law cannot be used to frustrate the federal legislative judgment
expressed in ICWA that the interests of the tribe in custodial decisions
made with respect to Indian children are as entitled to respect as the in-
terests of the parents."' If Utah's abandonment law cannot be used to
frustrate ICWA, a judicially created exception should not be used to
frustrate it either. The Utah Supreme Court recognized the best inter-
ests standard implicit in ICWA, stating "[t]he protection of this tribal in-
terest is at the core of ICWA, which recognizes that the tribe has an in-
terest in the child which is distinct from but on a parity with the interest
of the parents. '
The majority of states that have heard arguments relating to ICWA
57. 490 U.S. 30 (1989). In In re Baby Boy Doe, 849 P.2d 925 (Idaho 1993), the Idaho
Supreme Court held that the "Indian family" doctrine is an improper restriction on the appli-
cation of the Indian Child Welfare Act. Id. at 931. Citing Holyfield, the court stated that
"although an Indian family requirement has been applied by the courts of other states, we
believe that the United States Supreme Court has effectively undermined the imposition of
this requirement." Id.
58. 490 U.S. at 37
59. Id.
60. Nazarian, supra note 23, at 210.
61. Donna J. Goldsmith, Individual vs. Collective Rights: The Indian Child Welfare Act,
13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 4 (1995) (citations omitted).
62. 732 P.2d 962 (Utah 1986).
63. Id. at 970.
64. Id. at 969.
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recognize its implicit protection of the interests of tribes as well as indi-
vidual children and families:
" "It is incorrect when assessing ICWA's applicability to a
particular case to focus only upon the interests of an ex-
isting family."'
* "We initially note that in enacting ICWA, Congress did
not seek simply to protect the interests of individual In-
dian parents. Rather, Congress sought to also protect the
interests of Indian tribes and communities, and the inter-
ests of the Indian children themselves." 6
* "Limiting the Act's applicability solely to situations
where non family entities physically remove Indian chil-
dren from actual Indian dwellings deprecates the very
links-parental, tribal and cultural-the Act is designed
to preserve." 67
* "Mississippi Choctaw indicates that the jurisdictional pro-
visions of ICWA apply to child custody proceedings in-
volving Indian children regardless of where the children
are born or where they are proposed for adoption. This
application of ICWA is based on the interest the tribe has
in its children."'
* "[I]t is in keeping with the tenor of Holyfield which
stresses consideration of not only the wishes of the par-
ents, but the well-being and interests of the child and the
tribe.
, 69
These courts have recognized a best interests of the tribe standard in-
herent in ICWA.
Some courts do not employ the "best interests" standard, but instead
rely on the express provisions of ICWA to reject an "Indian family" ex-
ception. In In re Adoption of S.S.,70 the Illinois Court of Appeals spe-
cifically rejected the "Indian family" doctrine, stating:
We are troubled in no small measure by an approach which de-
parts from the clear language of the statute based upon a gener-
alized policy analysis. The provisions at issue are unambiguous
and the case at bar is undeniably within their scope ...
[P]ursuant to the plain language of the Act, depending on where
65. In the Matter of the Adoption of Baade, 462 N.W.2d 485,489 (S.D. 1990).
66. In re Adoption of T.N.F., 781 P.2d 973, 977 (Alaska 1989).
67. In re Crystal K., 276 Cal. Rptr. 619, 625 (Cal. App. 3d 1990).
68. In the Matter of Baby Boy Doe, 849 P.2d 925, 931 (Idaho 1993).
69. In the Adoption of Lindsay C., 280 Cal. Rptr. 194,201 (Cal. App. 3d 1991).
70. 622 N.E.2d 832 (Il. App. 1993).
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the children are domiciled, one or the other of these subsections
[of the Act] will be applicable ... [t]his limitation on the scope of
ICWA is entirely a judicial creation with no basis in the language
of ICWA.71
In In re Custody of S.B.R.,7 the Washington Court of Appeals held
that "the language of the Act makes but two exceptions; it does not ap-
ply to the custody provisions of a divorce decree nor to delinquency
proceedings., 73 The court went on to state that the explicit language of
the Act does not contain an "Indian family" exception, and the court
found "no compelling reason to create one."'74 The South Dakota Su-
preme Court also rejected the Indian family exception in In the Matter
of the Dependency and Neglect of N.S.7 The court emphasized that
there was no statutory requirement that a child be born into an Indian
home or community before ICWA applied. According to the court,
"No amount of probing into what Congress 'intended' can alter what
Congress said, in plain English, at 25 U.S.C. 1903(4). ' '76 In Quinn v.
Walters' the Oregon Court of Appeals held the "Indian family" doc-
trine to be:
directly in conflict with the idea of tribal sovereignty and the
policy of improving tribal ties reflected in ICWA. It also in-
volves exactly the type of state court interference that ICWA was
intended to protect against. If ICWA does not apply because the
parent is not "Indian" enough for a particular state court, the
protection afforded to the child, the parents and the tribe is de-
feated .
The court went on to say that the role of creating exceptions to ICWA
was left to Congress, and that it is not for state courts to add additional
requirements.79
Other courts have taken the view that the "Indian family" doctrine is
not a judicially-created theory but an exception "supported amply by
the language of the Act itself, and shored up by Congress' refusal to
amend ICWA." One California court defined the various "versions"
71. Id. at 838-39.
72. 719 P.2d 154 (Wash. App. 1986).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. 474 N.W.2d 96 (S.D. 1991).
76. Id. at 101.
77. 845 P.2d 206 (Or. App. 1993).
78. Id. at 208.
79. Id. at 209.
80. In the Matter of S.C. and J.C., 833 P.2d 1249, 1256 (Okla. 1992); see also S.A. v.
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of the Indian family exception:
One group of cases has refused to apply ICWA where the Indian
child himself has never lived in an Indian family and has had no
association with Indian culture, even though his biological parent
has had such associations .... Other cases have looked beyond
the Indian ties of the child to those of the parents when consid-
ering the existing Indian family exception to the applicability of
ICWA.8
The court went on to hold that ICWA did not apply to the placement of
the child in question, as neither the child nor the child's parents had
maintained a connection to the tribe.' The Oklahoma Supreme Court
found an "underlying thread that runs through the entire Act to the ef-
fect that the Act is concerned with the removal of Indian children from
an existing Indian family unit and the resultant breakup of the Indian
family."' This reliance on the "Indian family" effectively supersedes
the provisions of ICWA, which require the interests of the child, the
parents, and the tribe to be considered. More importantly, focusing on
the individual circumstances of the particular child in question is not
consistent with the assumption underlying ICWA-that the best inter-
ests of any Indian child are served by ensuring tribal participation in
placement and adoption proceedings.'
The language of ICWA, especially its purpose as defined by Con-
EJ.P., 571 So.2d 1187 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990) (applying the Indian family exception); In the
Matter of Appeal in Maricopa County, 667 P.2d 228, 233 n.6 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) (finding
that ICWA "does not attempt to preserve a child's right to its Indian heritage under all cir-
cumstances"); In the Matter of the Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168, 175 (Kan. 1982)
(holding that ICWA did not apply to a child who was "only 5/16ths Kiowa Indian, has never
been removed from an Indian family ... [and] would probably never become a part of the
[father's] or any other Indian family"); In the Matter of the Application of Bertelson, 617
P.2d 121 (Mont. 1989) (noting that ICWA is "not directed at disputes between Indian fami-
lies regarding custody of Indian children; rather, its intent is to preserve Indian culture [sic]
values under circumstances in which an Indian child is placed in a foster home or other pro-
tective institution"); In re S.A.M., 703 S.W.2d 603 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that ICWA
did not apply to an Indian father and non-Indian mother that had never lived as a family); In
the Matter of Adoption of Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d 1059 (Okla. 1985) (allowing the Indian
family exception to ICWA, which it subsequently expanded upon in In re S.C. and J.C., 833
P.2d 1249 (Okla. 1992)); Claymore v. Serr, 405 N.W.2d 650 (S.D. 1987) (finding that an In-
dian child must be part of an existing Indian family before the Act can apply); In Re Infant
Boy Crews, 825 P.2d 305,302 (Wash. 1992) (holding that ICWA does not apply when a child
is not being removed from an "existing Indian family unit or environment").
81. In re Alexandria Y. v. Renea Y., 53 Cal. Rptr.2d 679,684-85 (Cal. App. 2d 1996).
82 Id. at 687.
83. In the Matter of S.C. and J.C., 833 P.2d 1249, 1256 (Okla. 1992) (quoting In re
Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168,171 (Kan. 1982)).
84. 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (1978).
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gress, opposes any action which would result in the removal of Indian
children from their tribes. Congress sought to protect tribal participa-
tion in child placement proceedings because "there is no resource that is
more vital to the continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than
their children."' However, the Indian family doctrine assumes that if
you take away a child early enough from their tribe, they cannot de-
velop ties to the tribe and are therefore not part of an "Indian family":
The existing Indian family exception is based on the notion that
ICWA will only be applicable if an Indian child is removed from
an "existing Indian family unit" or "Indian home or culture."
When there is no "existing Indian family" from which an Indian
child is being removed, proponents of the exception argue,
ICWA is inapplicable. 6
The Indian family exception ignores the best interests of the tribe.
As the Utah Court of Appeals stated, "The policies of the Act require
its application not just to preserve an Indian parent's rights, or an Indian
family, but also the tribe's interest in its children. These policies are
frustrated by the adoption of the existing Indian family exception." 8 By
allowing parties to circumvent ICWA by demonstrating that the child
was never part of an "Indian family," state courts have effectively taken
back the autonomy implicit in "the best interests of the child" standard.
IV. INDIVIDUAL VERSUS TRIBAL RIGHTS
The term "Indian family" constrains the relations of tribal members
into a familiar construct. This construct may be consistent with an
American view of a nuclear family, but its application to an Indian child
is contrary to the provisions of ICWA.8 While the concept of collective
85. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3) (1978).
86. Davis, supra note 14, at 475 (citations omitted).
87. In the Interest of D.A.C., P.D.C., and S.D.C, 933 P.2d 993, 1000 (Utah Ct. App.
1997).
88. See Watts, supra note 17, at 22-23.
It is inherently difficult for a system founded on individual rights to deal effectively
with a cultural system based on communal duties and responsibilities and in which
individual rights are subordinate to the good of the group. The rights of communi-
ties are generally secondary to the right of individuals in contemporary American
society and it is a philosophical leap for courts to reverse this thought process when
dealing with Indian tribes. ICWA does encourage the existence of the tribal com-
munal culture and requires the non-Indian legal system to recognize and accommo-
date it.
In the context of tribal/communal culture, the weight of an individual parent's or of
both parents' consent to their child's adoption is diminished.
Because of the Unique cultural aspects of child care in tribal and extended family
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rights is not new to American jurisprudence, American society focuses
heavily on the rights of the individual over the community.
A rights-focused analysis is contrary to the provisions of ICWA. In
an article addressing the constitutional protections afforded children
under federal and state law, Professor Homer H. Clark, Jr. recognized
that ICWA includes a codification of the best interests of the tribe in
addition to the "best interests of the child" standard.' Professor Clark
argued that "[t]hese and other provisions of the Act effectively give
tribal political interests priority over the interests of Indian children
where adoption is concerned."'  He went on to note that no constitu-
tional challenge to the preferencing provisions of ICWA had been made
or presumably could be made." In fact, Professor Clark was in error. In
In re Bridget R., the plaintiffs challenged the Indian Child Welfare Act
on equal protection grounds.' The California Court of Appeals noted
that ICWA requires Indian children who cannot be cared for by their
natural parents to be treated differently from non-Indian children in the
same situation.? The court then went on to find that such disparate
treatment would rise to the level of an equal protection violation if no
social, cultural, or political relationships existed between Indian children
and their tribes.' The court also relied on a due process analysis to find
that the placement provisions of ICWA did not apply.' The court held
that the rights of children in their family relationships are at least as
fundamental and compelling as those of their parents, and that the chil-
dren in that case had a right to be placed with the "only family they had
ever known."' The court did not mention the rights of the tribe at all.
One author used the same analysis to question the constitutionality
of any race-based adoption law.' While specifically exempting ICWA
from his analysis, the author argues that any race-matching statute
would not survive strict scrutiny under an equal protection challenge.
settings, these parents' interest may be contrary to, and outweighed by, the best in-
terests of the children, their family, and their culture.
Id. at 214-15.
89.Homer H. Clark, Jr., Children and the Constitution, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 29 (1992).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507, 527 (Ct. App. 4th 1996).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 528.
95. Id. at 522-27.
96. Id.
97. Pattiz, supra note 16, at 2574.
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The author notes that the "best interests of the child" was given com-
pelling state interest status by the United States Supreme Court in Pal-
more v. Sidoti,9' and that the best interests of a child were not served by
delaying a child's adoption to serve a "cultural agenda." 99
The best interests of the tribe standard is part of the "collective
rights" thinking that is inherent in many Indian tribes. Many Indians
are taught to think of themselves as part of the larger cultural group,
where every child belongs to both its family and to the tribe. "The con-
cept that a mother has the right to remove her child from its extended
family and community, thereby depriving the child of its heritage, and
the community of its valued member, is foreign to Indian cultures.""
As author Catherine M. Brooks notes in her article chronicling the ap-
plication of ICWA in Nebraska:
In devising a system of child placement and adoption designed to
distance the child from his or her biological family, American ju-
risprudence has created a system of child rearing that is foreign
to the American Indian population, upon which the process is
used disproportionately frequently. Often, tribal languages do
not have an analog for the Anglo word "adoption." Equally un-
known to American Indian culture is the characteristic termina-
tion of all ties with an original family in order to create a new set
of attachments with a separate family. The spiritual bonds be-
tween mother and child, father and child, child and family, as ac-
knowledged in native peoples' cultural beliefs, make severance
incomprehensible.''
The United States Supreme Court recognized the disparity between
American jurisprudence and Indian philosophy in Holyfield. Citing the
Utah Supreme Court, the Court stated:
The protection of this tribal interest is at the core of ICWA,
which recognizes that the tribe has an interest in the child which
is distinct from but on a parity with the interest of the parents.
This relationship between Indian tribes and Indian children
domiciled on the reservation finds no parallel in other ethnic cul-
98. 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984).
99. Pattiz, supra note 16, at 2590.
100. Goldsmith, supra note 61 at 7-8, (citations omitted); see also Carriere, supra note
20, at 600 for a discussion of the "cultural construction of the Native American," and how this
construction operates in the Indian Child Welfare Act to "perpetuate the subordination of
Native American culture, families, and individuals." This article focuses on the reasons why
courts should not presume to adopt "Anglo" notions of the nuclear family and apply them to
Indian children.
101. Brooks, supra note 4, at 665 (citations omitted).
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tures found in the United States. It is a relationship that many
non-Indians find difficult to understand and that non-Indian
courts are slow to recognize. 1' 2
Although this passage specifically deals with children domiciled on the
reservation, the United States Supreme Court resolved the issue of
domicile in favor of the Indian view.m The "Indian family" doctrine
takes the domicile argument one step further. The "Indian family" doc-
trine assumes that a child that lives off the reservaion and does not
have any contact with any blood relatives is no longer part of an "Indian
family." Even in cases where a court rejects the "Indian family" excep-
tion, the idea of a cultural aspect to the Indian Child Welfare Act has
been upheld. For example, in In re Bridget R.,"°4 the California Court of
Appeals held that "a rule which would preclude the application of
ICWA to any Indian child who has not himself (or herself) lived in an
Indian family does not comport with either the language or purpose of
the Act," but went on to find that "it is questionable whether a rational
basis, far less a compelling need, exists for applying the requirements of
the Act where fully assimilated Indian parents seek to voluntarily relin-
quish children for adoption. ' 5 The idea of "full assimilation" implies
that the placement preferencing requirements of ICWA do not apply to
children of parents who are not culturally bound to their tribe.
The United States Supreme Court implied in Holyfield that the cor-
rect angle from which a court should view the application of ICWA is
from the vantage point of the tribe."° Therefore, the collective's rights
(i.e. the tribe's) should be given equal weight to the rights of the indi-
vidual (the child or the parent) under ICWA.
V. CONGRESSIONAL ATTEMPTS TO LIMIT THE INDIAN CHILD
WELFARE AcT
The best interests of a non-Indian child are defined by state courts
and welfare agencies. It is a highly discretionary standard, and has been
questioned as a means of determining placement. ' °7 The best interests of
an Indian child and the tribe are codified in ICWA, with the underlying
102. 490 U.S. 30,52 (1989).
103. Id.
104. 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 507 (Cal. App. 4th 1996).
105. Id at 522, 526.
106. 490 U.S. at 52.
107. "The standard is so embedded in Euro-American values that, unless it is radically
redefined, cultural bias inescapably results from its application." Carriere, supra note 20, at
615.
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presumption that it is in the best interests of an Indian child to be placed
with Indian parents, and it is in the best interests of an Indian tribe to
keep the child in the tribe. Lobbyists rely on this predetermined best
interest of Indian children as a reason to amend ICWA.'"
On April 6, 1995, Representatives Gerald Solomon of New York,
Dan Burton of Indiana, and Deborah Pryce of Ohio proposed an
amendment to the Indian Child Welfare Act ("Pryce Amendment").'09
The amendment proposed to "clarify" ICWA by defining a member of
an Indian tribe to be:
[O]nly those who are on the membership roll of a tribe, or those
who are otherwise considered members under consistently ap-
plied policies and practices, and in accordance with all written
requirements for membership. If over the age of eighteen before
first becoming a member of an Indian tribe, one should become a
member only upon his or her personal, written consent. For the
purposes of any child custody proceeding involving an Indian
child, membership in an Indian tribe should be effective from the
actual date of admission to membership in the Indian tribe, and
should not be given retroactive effect.no
Congresswoman Pryce stated that the proposed amendment was an
attempt to safeguard against:
the arbitrary, retroactive designation of individuals as members
of an Indian tribe in those instances where the biological par-
ent(s) of the child involved in either placement or adoption pro-
ceedings had absolutely no affiliation with a tribe either before,
or at the time of the child's birth; and the tribe is attempting to
invoke the protections afforded by ICWA in an effort to affect or
disrupt the outcome of such placement or adoption.'
By attempting to limit the application of ICWA to only those proceed-
ings in which the parent or child has an "affiliation with the tribe," it is
clear that the purpose of the amendment is to codify the Indian family
exception and apply it at a federal level. The American Academy of
108. "The fact is that ICWA, unlike other legislation pertaining to child welfare, does
not address in statute or regulation those policies of 'stability' or 'permanency' which are, af-
ter all critical to promoting any child's best interest." Establishing Status of Indian Children:
Hearings on S. 1448 Before the House Subcommittee on Native American and Insular Affairs,
104th Cong. (1995) (Testimony of Dr. William Pierce, President of National Council for
Adoption).
109. See H.R. 1448, 104th Cong. (1995).
110. Establishing Status of Indian Children: Hearings on S. 1448 Before the House Sub-
committee on Native American and Insular Affairs, 104th Cong. (1995) (Testimony of Con-
gresswoman Deborah Pryce).
111. Id.
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Adoption Attorneys even proposed its own amendments to broaden the
Pryce Amendment to "disenable tribes who misuse the provisions of the
Act to preclude adoptions of non-Indians.
'11 2
The Pryce Amendment would delete the "eligible for enrollment"
language of 25 U.S.C. § 1903 (4)(b), and replace it with the proposed
language above. This language "would unduly restrict the application of
ICWA, conditioning the definition of an 'Indian child' upon the formal
enrollment of the biological parent as members of a tribe at the time of
the child's birth. 113 The eligibility language currently in place in ICWA
allows the interests of the tribe in determining their membership to be
on par with those of the parent in child custody proceedings. The inter-
ests of the tribe would no longer be on par with that of the parents if an
enrollment requirement is passed by Congress. Not only that, but as
Terry Cross, the Executive Director of the National Indian Child Wel-
fare Association indicates, a requirement of enrollment would violate
the right of a tribe to determine its own membership.
1 4
This proposed amendment fails to recognize the competing interest
of an Indian tribe in custody proceedings involving an Indian child. The
problem with a concurrent jurisdictional scheme is quite apparent in this
light. If the tribe had exclusive jurisdiction in all custody proceedings
involving Indian children, the tribe would not have to "disrupt the out-
come of a placement or adoption." As is noted in the testimony of
Mark Tilden, representing the interests of twenty-three Indian tribes:
The importance of tribal primacy in matters of child custody and
adoption cannot be minimized, for ICWA is grounded on the
premise that tribal self-government is to be fostered and that few
matters are of more central interest to a tribe seeking to preserve
its identity and traditions than the determination of who will
112. Establishing Status of Indian Children: Hearings on S. 1448 Before the House Sub-
committee on Native American and Insular Affairs, 104th Cong. (1995) (Testimony of Attor-
ney Jane Gorman, American Academy of Adoption Attorneys).
113. Establishing Status of Indian Children: Hearings on S. 1448 Before the House Sub-
committee on Native American and Insular Affairs, 104th Cong. (1995) (Testimony of Delores
Gray Eyes, Program Director of the Indian Child Welfare Act).
114.
Enrollment does not equal membership in many situations. Tribal membership may
be determined in whole or in part by enrollment, but may also utilize traditional or
customary practices such as knowledge of kinship networks. Enrollment lists are
not, in fact, a traditional practice of tribes, but rather have been foisted upon tribes
by the federal government.
Establishing Status of Indian Children: Hearings on S. 1448 Before the House Subcommittee
on Native American and Insular Affairs, 104th Cong. (1995) (Testimony of Terry Cross, Ex-
ecutive Director of the National Indian Child Welfare Association).
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have the care and custody of its children. This bill will pierce
tribal sovereignty in three ways.
1. It will interfere with a tribe making a determination as to
who is a tribal member by allowing state courts to determine
whether tribal membership standards and practices are con-
sistently applied, with the focus being on "enrollment."
2. It does not permit Indian children who are tribal members
to shield themselves under the protective coverage of ICWA
unless they are members prior to the beginning of the child
custody proceedings.
3. It may possibly deprive tribes of jurisdiction over some In-
dian children resident and domiciled on the reservation be-
cause they would not be considered Indian children for the
purposes of ICWA under H.R. 1448.115
In In the Matter of S.C. and J.C.," 6 the Oklahoma Supreme Court
stated that "the preservation of the existing Indian family was an inte-
gral purpose of ICWA from its inception.'. 7 This statement by itself
may be true, but the subsequent holding of the Oklahoma Supreme
Court, denying the application of ICWA in that case, is indicative of the
larger problem of holding child custody hearings in state courts. The
"preservation of the existing Indian family" could mean a very different
thing to a tribal judge than it would to an Oklahoma judge. Because of
this disparity, ICWA was created to remove Indian child custody pro-
ceedings to tribal court whenever possible.
The Pryce Amendment was overwhelmingly supported by adoption
agencies, and overwhelmingly rejected by Indian tribes and attorneys
who work in the area of Indian child placement."' This fact in itself is
indicative of the problem with allowing state courts concurrent jurisdic-
tion with tribal courts in deciding Indian child placement matters-the
application of a "best interests" standard, as defined by the state, is too
tempting to resist. The state adoption agencies and state courts have
been trained to determine what is in the best interests of a child. Re-
ducing their discretion by telling them that the best interests of an In-
dian child are tied to the best interests of the child's tribe is too bitter a
pill.
115. Establishing Status of Indian Children: Hearings on S. 1448 Before the House Sub-
committee on Native American and Insular Affairs, 104th Cong. (1995) (Testimony of Attor-
ney Mark Tilden, Native American Rights Fund).
116. 833 P.2d 1249 (Okla. 1992).
117. Id. at 1255
118. See H.R. 1448, 104th Cong. (1995).
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The May 10, 1995, hearings on the proposed amendments to ICWA
resulted in a direction by the Committee on Resources to the National
Association of Adoption Attorneys, the Alaska Federation of Natives,
the National Indian Child Welfare Association, and all concerned In-
dian Tribes to draft a working document on the Pryce Amendment and
the issues it raised regarding ICWA.1'9 The Committee on Resources
apparently felt that some clarification of ICWA was in order. Even
those opposed to the amendment supported the clarification of ICWA
in some areas. An alternative amendment was proposed by Representa-
tive Young of Alaska in the House of Representative on March 13,
1997,"° and by Senator John McCain of Arizona in the Senate on April
14, 1997."' This amendment to ICWA sets forth specific notice re-
quirements for tribes to intervene in a placement proceeding, time lines
for intervention, criminal sanctions for knowingly violating or encour-
aging another to violate ICWA, time limits on the withdrawal of volun-
tary consent for child placement, a duty on attorneys and agencies to in-
form Indian parents of their rights under ICWA, and other
modifications of ICWA that attempt to address some of the problems
that have been encountered by courts, tribes, and families in the past J"
No action has been taken on this proposed amendment by the House or
Senate to date.
The provisions of H.R. 1448, the "Pryce Amendment," were rein-
troduced through Title III of H.R. 3286, the "Adoption Promotion and
Stability Act of 1996." Hearings were conducted on Title III, H.R. 3286
before the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs on June 26, 1996.
Again, the proposed amendment to ICWA was overwhelmingly sup-
ported by adoption agency attorneys and rejected by tribes. '21 Members
of Congress also testified against adoption of the amendments,'24 as did
119. Id.
120. H.R. 1082, 105th Cong. (1997).
121. S. 569, 105th Cong. (1997).
122. See H.R. 1082 and S. 569, 105th Cong. (1997).
123. See Hearing before the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, 105th Cong. (1996)
(Testimony of Jane A. Gorman and Marc Gradstein on behalf of adoptive parents, Testi-
mony of Attorney Jack F. Trope on behalf of the Association of American Indian Affairs,
Inc., Testimony of W. Ron Allen, President of the National Congress of American Indians,
Testimony of National Indian Child Welfare Association, Testimony of Menominee Tribe of
Indians of Wisconsin, Testimony of Governor Mary V. Thomas of the Gila River Indian
Community, and Testimony of Deborah J. Doxtator, Chairwoman of the Oneida Tribe of
Indians of Wisconsin).
124. See Hearing before the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, 105th Cong. (1996)
(Testimony of Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega and Honorable Don Young). Representa-
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the Department of Justice" and the Bureau of Indian Affairs.126 The
Pryce Amendment language was subsequently removed from the Adop-
tion Promotion and Stability Act.' Congress has not taken any further
action to amend ICWA to date.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Indian Child Welfare Act was an attempt by Congress to codify
the "best interests of the child" standard as it applies to ethnicity. Con-
gress made the assumption when passing ICWA that the best interests
of an Indian child were necessarily tied to the interests of the child's
tribe, and to the child's ethnic heritage. ICWA requires notice to a
child's tribe, the right of a child's tribe to intervene in placement pro-
ceedings, and placement preferences as codification of this assumption.
Yet despite the apparently unambiguous language of ICWA, courts con-
tinue to find exceptions to its application. The "Indian family" excep-
tion is one such attempt to apply the state's or the court's assumptions
regarding the best interests of a child, as is the "good cause" exception.
Even the amendments created to limit the application of ICWA are
proposed "in the best interests of the children."'"
The "best interests of the child" standard is ambiguous and highly
subjective. Whether it be a court-created exception, attempts by Con-
gress at modification, or simply ignoring the law, attempts to codify the
"best interests of the child" standard to include the ethnic heritage of a
child face an uphill battle. Restricting the autonomy of state agencies
and courts is the method utilized under ICWA, putting the interests of
the tribe and the parents on par with those of the child. Under § 1808(c)
tive George Miller relied on anecdotal testimony to illustrate the "best interests of the child"
standard within the Indian Child Welfare Act. Id. "The Tribe not only consented to the
adoption of the children by their non-Indian grandparents, but it took the extra step of help-
ing to arrange a creative arrangement that allows the children to maintain a connection with
their Indian family while being raised by their white grandparents." Hearing before the Sen-
ate Committee on Indian Affairs, 105th Cong. (1996) (Testimony of Representative George
Miller).
125. Hearing before the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, 105th Cong. (1996)
(Testimony of Seth P. Waxman, Associate Deputy Attorney General, Department of Jus-
tice).
126. Hearing before the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, 105th Cong. (1996)
(Testimony of Ada E. Deer, Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs, Department of the Inte-
rior).
127. See generally H.R. 3286, 104th Cong. (1996).
128. Hearing before the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, 105th Cong. (1996)
(Testimony of Senator John Glenn).
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of the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996,129 Congress defined
the best interest of a non-Indian child as placement regardless of the
race or ethnicity of the parents. Interestingly, in cases involving the
placement of black children with non-black families, courts often invoke
the "best interests of the child" language to necessitate a placement
finding.
Regardless of the method used by Congress to codify the "best in-
terests of the child" standard, they must first consider the assumptions
that go into that codification. As Linda Hodges, a woman who adopted
an Indian child in 1969, noted:
Before lawmakers encourage adoptions of Indian children by
non-Indian families, before they remove tribal jurisdiction over
child custody proceedings, before state courts interpret "good
cause" as economic superiority, they need to acknowledge the
strength of biological and cultural ties that Indian tribes can offer
their own children."3
129. Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1808(c), 110 Stat.
1904 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1996b (1996)).
130. Linda Hodges, Blood Ties, N.Y. TIMEs, July 19,1996, at Op.Ed.
1997)

